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1 Introduction
Examining and testing whether capital market imperfections affect firm behavior has been in the
financial economics agenda at least since the seminal contribution of Fazzari et al. (1988), who pro-
vide evidence that financial constraints matter for corporate investment (see Schiantarelli (1995);
Hubbard (1998); and Bond and Reenen (2006), for surveys). Following this study, investment–
cash flow sensitivities have been a popular metric for gauging the importance of financial con-
straints. Recently, partly due to critiques regarding the validity of these sensitivities as an infor-
mative indicator of financial constraints, a number of authors have suggested an alternative frame-
work, in order to identify financial constraints.1 Among these, Almeida et al. (2004) propose to
examine the cash flow sensitivity of cash.2 Their simple idea is that firms with investment opportu-
nities but limited or no access to external capital markets (constrained firms) will save cash out of
cash flow when they anticipate to need resources for future investment expenditures. By contrast,
unconstrained firms will not engage in such liquidity management since they can easily acquire
external finance when the need arises.
Based on empirical tests using a savings–cash flow regression framework and data from the
U.S. and other G-7 countries, Almeida et al. (2004) and, subsequently, Khurana et al. (2006) pro-
vide evidence, that confirms the prediction above: constrained firms exhibit a positive sensitivity
of cash to cash flow, while unconstrained firms exhibit no systematic sensitivity. The authors inter-
pret these results as more powerful and less ambiguous evidence of financial constraints, relative to
results obtained within the investment–cash flow framework. By contrast, in an influential paper,
Riddick and Whited (2009) generalize the theoretical analysis in Almeida et al. (2004) and provide
1Critiques raised by Kaplan and Zingales (1997), Cleary (1999), and more recently by Erickson and Whited
(2000, 2002, 2012), Gomes (2001), Cooper and Ejarque (2003), Abel and Eberly (2003), Cummins et al. (2006) and
Tsoukalas (2011) cast doubt on the validity of investment-cash flow sensitivities as indicators for the presence of cap-
ital market imperfections. Broadly speaking these critiques refer to either measurement error in Tobin’s Q (which
typically controls for investment opportunities) or specification bias associated with the linear investment equation
augmented with cash flow.
2Hereafter, we will refer to savings and cash accumulation interchangeably.
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robust evidence that once measurement error in Tobin’s Q is accounted for, the sensitivity of sav-
ings to cash flow is negative for the majority of firms from the U.S. and other G-7 countries they
examine. They conclude that while the savings–cash flow sensitivity contains information about
financial constraints, other confounding factors, render this sensitivity no more informative than
the investment–cash flow sensitivity.
Given these apparently conflicting findings our goal in this paper is to derive testable predic-
tions regarding the savings–cash flow sensitivity from a model with lumpy investment, costly ex-
ternal finance, and cash accumulation (similar to the one analyzed in Riddick and Whited (2009)).3
We then propose a modification to the original Almeida et al. (2004) equation that, while nesting
the latter specification, provides a sharper empirical test for our model’s predictions. Using the
model as a laboratory, we also examine the extent to which the savings–cash flow sensitivity may
contain information on the presence of costly external finance.
The intuition for our savings equation is as follows. A stylized version of the model generates
two investment regimes: periods during which firms experience low or zero investment in phys-
ical capital (investment inaction) and periods during which firms invest substantially (investment
spikes). Due to the intermittent nature of investment in the model, firms that face costly external
finance use cash to transfer resources from periods of investment inaction to periods of invest-
ment spikes, in order to avoid using more costly external funds when they invest during spikes. In
other words, firms accumulate cash (or equivalently save) during inaction periods and decumulate
cash (or equivalently dissave) during periods of investment spikes. This behavior results from the
assumption of costly external finance. In the model, firms invest in large bursts either during pe-
riods when productivity is high or when the capital stock has (through depreciation) fallen below
a threshold, or both. These bursts are very intense and, due to the presence of the fixed cost when
3Investment lumpiness has been extensively documented in earlier work. Fixed costs make investment spending
lumpy, i.e. periods of investment inaction are followed by periods of investment (or dis-investment) bursts (or spikes).
Doms and Dunne (1998) and Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006), provide evidence from plant level data which exhibit
these features, as a consequence of fixed capital adjustment costs.
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investment is non-zero, concentrated in a single period.
At the same time, the presence of investment lumpiness and costly external finance generates
a non-linear cash policy. Firms maintain a constant level of cash during periods of inaction (in
order to use it when they invest during spikes to avoid the costly external finance), so the policy
rule is flat during those periods. When there is an investment spike, firms use some or all of this
cash to finance investment (as cash flow is not sufficient to finance these large bursts of activity).
Thus, during and immediately after an investment spike, the cash policy is very non-linear: Cash
changes from a positive level to either zero or a lower positive level (depending on the size of the
spike). Hence, the change in cash, i.e. savings, is negative during the periods immediately before
and during the spike. The firm then builds up its cash level to what it was prior to the spike, so the
change in cash or savings becomes positive. To summarize, the cash policy follows a step function,
i.e, high-low-high-low.
Our model generates therefore periods during which the change in cash switches sign abruptly,
while cash flow typically rises: just prior and during a spike (high productivity) and also after a
spike (since productivity is persistent and firms have built a lot of capital). In the model, these
periods dominate the savings–cash flow correlation. A clear empirical prediction arising from the
model is therefore that the savings–cash flow sensitivity will switch sign as firms switch investment
regimes. Importantly, the design of the model is such that this behavior is entirely absent for firms
that are financially unconstrained, because these firms are impatient (i.e. their discount rate is
higher than the market interest rate, and they prefer to distribute profits to the firm’s owners). In
other words, unconstrained firms will keep zero cash in all times and states.
The new savings equation we propose is based on the mechanics of the model regarding in-
vestment spikes and cash accumulation explained above. Specifically, it takes into account the
investment regime when estimating the cash flow sensitivity of cash accumulation, and focuses on
the sign switch in this sensitivity as firms change investment regimes, rather than on the overall
magnitude and sign of the sensitivity as in Almeida et al. (2004) and Riddick and Whited (2009).
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Similar to Riddick and Whited (2009), our analysis indicates that the overall sign and magnitude
of the sensitivity from the standard specification may not necessarily be informative as a sum-
mary measure of financial constraints in the presence of investment lumpiness. Relative to our
proposed specification, the overall sensitivity from the standard specification may be affected by
parameters that are not related to financial constraints, i.e. parameters related to production and
investment technologies. In our simulation exercise, we show that (with a suitable calibration) the
overall sensitivity obtained from the standard specification may indicate (incorrectly) the absence
of costly external finance. By contrast, our simulation results suggest that the sign switch in the
cash flow sensitivity of cash accumulation is remarkably robust to variations in those parameters.
Hence compared to the standard Almeida et al. (2004) specification, our proposed specification is
in principle equipped to be used as a sharp test for the model’s predictions, and our model sim-
ulations suggest it may contain information for detecting financial constraints under investment
lumpiness. Moreover, it is as simple as the original Almeida et al. (2004) equation to implement.
An important caveat of our analysis is in order. The empirical test based on the modified savings
equation we propose is not monotonic in the degree of financial constraints and hence it can only
suggest the presence, rather than definitively establish, the magnitude and the intensity of financial
constraints. In general, parameters that depend on production technologies and other features of
the model affect this sensitivity and only structural estimation approaches (such as, for example,
the one proposed in Hennessy and Whited (2007)) can hope to accurately identify relative degrees
of financial constraints. This goes beyond the scope of this paper.
Of course, the reliability of our conclusions and the validity of the modified equation we pro-
pose depend on the information contained in the sample we use to implement our empirical test.
The advantage of our approach lies in the fact that we encompass both regimes of investment and
thus exploit the entire spectrum of the model’s prediction. Our dataset allows to control for differ-
ences in investment regimes as it contains such information. We choose a sample that (a) comes
from a universe of unlisted small firms (thus likely to face severe financial constraints) and (b)
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exhibits lumpy investment behavior. Specifically, our sample consists of a panel of 4,181 firms
from four transition economies (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Poland, and Romania) and 9,210
firms from four developed economies (Belgium, France, Germany and the U.K.). We estimate the
modified savings equation that controls for investment regimes and, in line with the predictions of
our model, find negative and significant savings–cash flow sensitivities for firms that experience
investment spikes and positive and significant savings–cash flow sensitivities for firms that are not
in a spike regime.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we describe our model. Section 3
presents simulation results, which motivate our empirical analysis. Section 4 describes our dataset
and presents some descriptive statistics. Section 5 illustrates our baseline specifications and esti-
mation methodology. Section 6 presents our main empirical results, and section 7 concludes.
2 The Model
We model an industry with many heterogenous firms that produce, invest in fixed capital, and save
in cash, where cash earns a risk free rate of return. As in Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006), invest-
ment is subject to both convex and non-convex adjustment costs. These costs are a combination of
quadratic and fixed adjustment costs. External finance is available, but only at a premium over the
risk free rate. The following sections describe the set-up of our model.
2.1 The firm’s problem: Production and investment
Firm j0s production function at time t is given by:
yjt = sjtk

jt; 0 <  < 1; (1)
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where production, yjt, depends on capital, kjt, and a productivity disturbance, sjt. The parameter 
determines the share of capital in production. The (log of) the productivity disturbance is assumed
to follow an AR(1) process:
ln(sjt+1) = ln(sjt) + "jt+1; (2)
where,  is the autoregressive parameter, and "jt is assumed to be distributed as IID N(0; ), with
 denoting the standard deviation.
The firm accumulates capital according to the following rule:
kjt+1 = (1  k)kjt + ijt; 0  k  1; (3)
where ijt is fixed investment and k denotes the depreciation rate of capital.
Adjusting the capital stock is assumed to be costly. Specifically, as in Cooper and Haltiwanger
(2006), we assume the firm faces both convex and non-convex adjustment costs. The adjustment
costs consist of two components: a variable cost component, cv(it; kt), given by a quadratic form:
cv(ijt; kjt) =

2
 ijt
kjt
2
kjt;   0: (4)
and a non-convex component which is given by:
cf (kjt) =
8><>: Fkjt for ijt 6= 00 for ijt = 0
9>=>; ; F  0; (5)
where F denotes a fixed cost incurred by the firm during investment episodes. This component is
scaled by the capital stock, kjt, to eliminate any size effects.
In addition to the real decisions described above, firms also make a financial decision. Specifi-
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cally, in each period each firm decides the amount of cash to hold, bjt. By definition, this amount
is constrained to be non-negative, i.e. firms can only save. Savings earn a positive post-tax risk-
free interest rate of r. As in Gomes (2001) and Whited (2006), we assume that firms can obtain
external funds to finance expenditure but only at a premium over the rate offered on savings. This
is a parsimonious and tractable way to introduce costly external finance in the model. Specifically,
whenever a firm’s expenditure exceeds the available sources of income, the firm pays a premium
over the risk-free rate. Formally, let
!jt = sjtk

jt   kjt+1 + (1  k)kjt   Fkjt  

2
(kjt+1   (1  k)kjt)2
kjt
+ (1 + r)bjt   bjt+1 (6)
denote the firm’s net cash flow or dividend. We assume the firm pays a cost of obtaining external
finance given by a function, 't(), such that, 't() > 0 if !jt < 0, and 't() = 0 otherwise. To
make this operational we assume it takes the following form:
'( !jt) =( !jt) = 
 
kjt+1   (1  k)kjt   sjtkjt
+ Fkjt +

2
(kjt+1   (1  k)kjt)2
kjt
  (1 + r)bjt + bjt+1

(7)
In the expression above,  is a parameter capturing the premium the firm pays above the risk-
free rate in order to use external funds. Notice that the expression in the external finance cost
function is simply expenditures minus internal sources of funds. This cost is assumed to be linear.
Also note that other things being equal, a higher level of cash, bjt, helps to reduce the cost of
external finance.
Given the structure of the problem above, the firm will find itself in either of two investment
regimes: a regime where it invests heavily, and a regime where investment is low (e.g. to cover
depreciation) or zero.4 Let the value function describing each regime be given by V a(st; kt; bt)
4With both quadratic and fixed adjustment costs, firms with a small capital stock may, conditional on productivity,
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and V i(st; kt; bt) for the active and the inactive regime, respectively (dropping the subscript j for
convenience). The firm then solves the following problem:
V (st; kt; bt) = maxfV a(st; kt; bt); V i(st; kt; bt)g (8)
The value functions for the active and inactive regimes are given respectively by:
V a(st; kt; bt) =stk

t   kt+1 + (1  k)kt  

2
(kt+1   (1  k)kt)2
kt
  Fkt + (1 + r)bt   bt+1   't() + Est+1jstV (st+1; kt+1; bt+1); (9)
and
V i(st; kt; bt) =stk

t   't() + (1 + r)bt   bt+1 + Est+1jstV (st+1; kt(1  k); bt+1)): (10)
In the value function formulation above,  denotes the discount factor and E, the expectation
operator. One particular and important feature of the solution concerns the behavior of cash, bt.
In the simulation exercise described below, we assume that (1 + r) < 1 so that absent any cost
of obtaining external funds, the firm will never hold positive cash balances (equivalently, it will
always distribute profits to owners). In fact, cash balances will always be set equal to zero in this
case. If however, there is a premium for using external funds—as captured by the '() function—,
then the firm will find it optimal to save in order to reduce or eliminate the future external finance
cost when investing. We will return to this point below.
choose a low investment level, rather than an investment spike. This is because, the quadratic costs penalize the firm
for making large adjustments, while fixed costs penalize the firm for making small and frequent investments. Appendix
A fleshes out the intuition behind the model in more detail.
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2.2 Solution and calibration
We solve the dynamic programming problem above using value function iteration. The model is
parameterized assuming the time period is one year. The details of the solution and the calibra-
tion of model parameters are described in Appendix A. The outcome of this exercise are policy
functions for investment and cash. These policy functions are given by, It = I(kt; bt; st), and
bt+1 = b(kt; bt; st), respectively. We use the policy functions to simulate panels that are broadly in
line with the characteristics of our data sample (see Appendix A, and Section 4).5
It is useful to briefly comment on the policy functions. First, given the fixed cost of adjustment,
investment displays a non-monotonic relationship with respect to capital. It is well known that
with fixed costs of adjustment, the optimal investment policy entails periods of inactivity followed
by periods of strong positive investment activity or investment spikes. For example, the firm will
adjust its capital stock upward, either when it is hit by a sufficiently high and persistent productivity
shock, or when the capital stock declines below a critical level and the productivity of capital
becomes very high. This is the well known (S,s) adjustment rule as illustrated in Abel and Eberly
(1996), Caballero and Engel (1999), and others. However, the presence of quadratic adjustment
costs also implies that, conditional on productivity, firms may choose a low investment rate because
these costs penalize large adjustments in capital.
The important characteristic of the solution that we will exploit in the empirical section below
concerns the behavior of cash. Under costless external finance, the firm sets cash balances equal to
zero (at all times and states), as it discounts the future more heavily compared to the return earned
on cash (recall the assumption (1 + r) < 1). However, this changes when there is a premium on
external funds as captured by the external finance cost, '().
The presence of investment lumpiness and costly external finance generates a non-linear cash
policy. Firms will maintain a constant level of cash during periods of inactivity or low activity
5The model we use is quite stylized. Its value lies in illustrating the main forces behind investment and cash
accumulation, rather than in providing a complete and accurate description of investment behavior in our sample of
firms.
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(e.g. replacement investment), in order to use it when they invest during a spike, to avoid the
costly external finance. Thus the cash policy rule is flat during those periods. When there is
an investment spike, firms use some or all of this cash to finance investment, as cash flow is not
sufficient for these large bursts of activity, and they are very reluctant to use costly external finance.
Thus, before, during and immediately after an investment spike, the cash policy is very non-linear.
Cash changes from a positive level to either zero or a lower positive level (depending on the size
of the spike). So, the change in cash, i.e. savings, during these periods (immediately before and
during the spike) is negative. The firm then builds up its cash level to what it was prior to the
spike, so the change in cash or savings becomes positive. To summarize, the cash policy follows
a step function, i.e. high-low-high-low. The firm will accumulate cash in periods of investment
inactivity or periods of low investment, where cash flow is more than enough to finance this low
level of investment. It will then use the accumulated cash to finance spikes of investment activity
when it finds it optimal to do so. This behavior is a direct consequence of the firm’s incentive to
minimize the need to use external funds when investing. Consequently, the sensitivity of savings
to cash flow will vary according to the investment regime the firm is operating in. The sensitivity
will be positive in periods of inactivity as the firm builds up cash balances in anticipation of future
spikes, and negative in periods of investment spikes as the firm uses the accumulated cash to invest
while cash flow is rising due to the high productivity of capital.6 Figure 1 in Appendix A illustrates
these features of the solution using a very simple version of the model. This is the key feature of
the solution we exploit in Section 5.
6In the model simulations discussed in Section 3, firms may at times find it optimal to invest at a low rate (e.g.
replacement investment). In this case, they may still accumulate cash in anticipation of a future investment spike,
provided their cash flow is sufficient to finance this low investment level.
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3 Simulation results
We use the policy functions obtained in the previous section in order to generate samples of firms
that differ according to (a) the history of idiosyncratic shocks they face and (b) their initial size (as
measured by the capital stock). We simulate two industries each consisting of 25,000 firm-year
observations. One industry faces a premium for external funds (as specified in equation (7)), while
the other does not. We use the two simulated panels to test whether the empirical equation we
propose can reliably identify the firms that face costly external finance.
3.1 Savings specification under lumpiness
Since the sensitivity of savings to cash flow crucially depends on the investment regime as ex-
plained above, we estimate the following equation:
bit+1
bit + kit
= 0 + 1
sales growthit
bit + kit
+ 2
CashF lowit
bit + kit
 SPIKEit + 3CashF lowit
bit + kit
 (1  SPIKEit)
+4(bit + kit) + it
(11)
In the equation above,  is the first difference operator and SPIKEit is a dummy variable
that controls for the investment regime. Specifically, it takes the value of one for observations with
investment spikes and zero for all other observations. We define an investment spike when the
investment rate exceeds 50%. We will also use this distinction in the empirical section below in
order to sharpen our empirical test and link it precisely with our theoretical model. In the equation
above, we use sales growth as a measure of investment opportunities, for consistency with the
empirical work (our firms are unlisted).7 Sales growth for firm j is defined as the growth in sjtkjt.
7For robustness, in all our simulation results, we have also used Tobin’sQ (computed from the model simulations),
defined as the value of the firm over its capital stock, instead of sales growth as a right hand side variable. The
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Also note that the equation above is a modified version of the empirical equation in Almeida et al.
(2004), the only difference being the SPIKEit dummy.
The top panel of Table 1 reports estimation results from equation (11). As predicted by the
model, firms in the non-spike regime exhibit positive savings-cash flow sensitivities, while firms
who experience spikes exhibit negative savings-cash flow sensitivities. Thus a defining charac-
teristic of the specification is that it clearly shows the sign switch in the cash flow sensitivity of
savings predicted by the model. The results from this regression clearly illustrate the ability of the
savings regression to detect the presence of costly external finance in the simulated panels. This
can be seen by comparing the savings cash flow sensitivities in columns 1 and 2 in the top panel of
Table 1. These sensitivities are statistically different from zero (either positive or negative depend-
ing on the investment regime) in the industry with costly external finance, but identically equal to
zero in the industry without costly external finance. The intuition for this follows directly from the
solution of the model with and without costly external finance. In the industry with costly external
finance, savings are accumulated during non-spike periods, and run down during spike periods. By
contrast, in the industry without costly external finance, savings are equal to zero at all times and
states, so the coefficients on the right hand side variables are identically equal to zero.
It is interesting to compare the results above with results obtained from a specification that
ignores the distinction of investment regimes,
bit+1
bit + kit
= 0 + 1
sales growthit
bit + kit
+ 2
CashF lowit
bit + kit
+ 3(bit + kit) + it (12)
The savings regression above comes directly from Almeida et al. (2004) and was subsequently
used by Khurana et al. (2006) and Riddick and Whited (2009). The bottom panel of Table 1 re-
ports the estimates from this specification. Because in the simulation, there is a higher fraction of
observations that are inactive (exhibiting a positive sensitivity, approximately 65% of the sample)
regression results from this specification were qualitatively similar to those presented in Table 1 and are not reported
for brevity but are available upon request.
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compared to firms that exhibit investment spikes (exhibiting a negative sensitivity, approximately
35% of the sample), the average sensitivity is positive in the industry with costly external finance.
By contrast, in the model without costly external finance, savings, and consequently the savings-
cash flow sensitivities, are zero in all periods. A notable finding which adds to the credibility
of our proposed equation (11), is the significant increase in R
2
between the specification that ig-
nores investment regimes (0.06) and the specification that controls for them (0.43). This suggests
the dummy variable SPIKEit captures to a great extent the non-linearity in the savings policy
function and improves the fit of the equation. Yet, given that, in this model environment, the con-
ventional specification seems to be successful in detecting the presence of costly external finance,
what makes our proposed specification more suitable when testing for the presence of costly ex-
ternal finance? This point can be illustrated by looking at alternative model parameterizations.
3.2 Alternative model parameterizations
We now examine the robustness of the theoretical predictions regarding the sign switch in the
cash flow sensitivity of cash accumulation under different parameterizations of the model. This
exercise confirms that the conventional specification is misspecified and, importantly, may lead to
incorrect conclusions regarding the existence of financial constraints. In this section we focus on
the parameters that control for adjustment costs, the depreciation rate, and on those that control
for the volatility and persistence of the productivity process. An extensive sensitivity analysis of
the key prediction to all model parameters is reported in Appendix A (Tables A.3 to A.8). It is
shown that the sign switch in the cash flow sensitivity of cash accumulation is remarkably robust
to variation in a sensible range of model parameters.
The top panel of Table 2 reports estimation results from equation (11), while the bottom panel
reports estimation results from the standard specification, equation (12). The Table reports results
from four different parameterizations of the model, each described in the relevant column, includ-
ing the baseline calibration. As predicted by the model, under all different parameterizations, firms
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that do not experience spikes (i.e. whose investment rates are always below 50%) exhibit positive
savings-cash flow sensitivities, while firms who experience spikes (i.e. investment rates above
50%) exhibit negative savings-cash flow sensitivities. In the column labelled ‘Perturbation I’, in-
creasing the depreciation rate increases the fraction of observations where firms undertake positive
investment. The estimated cash flow coefficient interacted with the SPIKE dummy are in line
with the predictions of the model, namely negative during investment spikes and positive other-
wise. The bottom panel in the same column shows that the overall sensitivity is negative, which
echoes the result in Riddick and Whited (2009), but also suggests that the sign of the overall sensi-
tivity does not provide information regarding the existence of costly external finance. The column
labelled ‘Perturbation II’ reports results from a simulated panel where the fixed cost and convex
cost adjustment parameters are both reduced to 0.01 and the depreciation rate is set at 0.25, while
the parameters associated with the productivity process are as in the column labelled ‘Perturbation
I’. The column labelled ‘Perturbation III’ reports results from a simulated panel where the fixed
cost and convex cost adjustment parameters are both reduced to 0.01 and all other parameters are
as in the baseline. In both cases, the estimated cash flow coefficients interacted with the SPIKE
dummy are again in line with the predictions of the model. Regardless of the perturbation, our
proposed empirical specification exhibits the sign switch.
In the column labelled ‘Perturbation IV’, the depreciation parameter is increased to 0.25. The
interesting finding with this calibration is that the conventional specification (without the SPIKE
dummy) shows an insignificantly different from zero cash flow sensitivity of cash accumulation
(bottom panel). This suggests that a researcher who ignores the lumpiness factor will erroneously
conclude that this panel of firms is not subject to costly external finance. Even though the firms
in the sample are subject to costly external finance, the standard specification cannot detect it. In
other words, if the null hypothesis is the presence of financial constraints, there is a significant type
I error in this regression. By contrast, as shown by the top panel, the specification that controls
for investment lumpiness correctly predicts a negative sensitivity during investment spikes and a
15
positive sensitivity otherwise, i.e. the sign switch, indicative of costly external finance.
Overall, the results reported in Tables 1 and 2, clearly suggest the ability of the proposed
savings specification to detect the presence of costly external finance in the simulated panels.
4 Data, summary statistics, and investment distributions
4.1 Data and summary statistics
Our data set is drawn from the annual accounting reports taken from the AMADEUS database, pub-
lished by Bureau Van Dijk Electronic Publishing (BvDEP). The database includes balance sheet
and profit and loss information for over 11 million public and private companies in 41 European
countries over the period 1998-2005.8 Our focus is on four transition economies, namely, Bul-
garia, the Czech Republic, Poland and Romania (also studied by Konings et al. (2003)) and four
developed economies, namely, Belgium, France, Germany and the U.K. (studied by Bond et al.
(2003) who focus on investment–cash flow sensitivities). The sample we choose to work with is
particularly well suited for evaluating the validity of the model predictions and consequently the
suitability of our proposed empirical specification as a test for the sign switch in the presence of
costly external finance, as it provides information on unlisted companies which are particularly
likely to face costly external finance and/or financing constraints (Guariglia (2008)).9 The im-
portance of investment lumpiness, a key consideration for testing our proposed specification, is
documented below in section 4.2.
We drop observations with negative sales, as well as observations with negative total assets.
Firms that do not have complete records on our main regression variables are also dropped. To
control for the potential influence of outliers, we exclude observations in the one percent tails of
8To be included in Amadeus, companies must satisfy at least one of the following criteria: i) turnover greater than
15 million EUR; ii) number of employees greater than 150; iii) total assets greater than 30 million EUR. In addition to
financial information, Amadeus also assigns companies a four-digit NACE Rev. 1 code which we use to classify firms
and construct industry dummy variables. Our sample is limited to firms that operate in the manufacturing industry.
9In particular, according to our data 99.9% of the firms in the sample are not publicly quoted.
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each of our regression variables. Finally, we drop all firms with less than 5 years of consecutive
observations. Our final panel, which is unbalanced, covers 459 firms for Bulgaria (corresponding to
2250 observations), 1515 firms for the Czech Republic (corresponding to 7479 observations), 1201
firms for Poland (corresponding to 5428 observations), 1006 firms for Romania (corresponding to
4513 observations), 1536 firms for Belgium (corresponding to 8475 observations), 4133 firms for
France (corresponding to 21574 observations), 842 firms for Germany (corresponding to 3204
observations), and 2699 firms for the U.K. (corresponding to 10214 observations). Table 3 reports
summary statistics. Definitions of all variables are provided in Appendix A. The cash to assets ratio
ranges from 5.8% in Romania to 7% in the Czech Republic, and from 5.9% in Germany to 9.1%
in Belgium. These numbers are lower than those reported by Almeida et al. (2004) for US firms,
which range from 8-9% for unconstrained firms to 15% for their constrained counterparts, but are
in line with those reported by Kalcheva and Lins (2007) for countries such as Spain and Portugal.
Finally, the cash accumulation to assets ratios range from approximately 0.1% for Romania to
0.9% for Bulgaria, and vary between 0.2% and 0.6% in the four developed economies. Investment
rates in all eight countries are quite high on average, ranging from around 17% in Romania to
35% in Belgium, and there is significant variation around the mean as evidenced from the standard
deviations.
4.2 Investment distributions: evidence for lumpiness
In this section we describe some features of firm investment rates in our dataset. Figure 1 shows
the investment rates’ distributions for each country. On immediate inspection, the distributions
appear to be non-normal. There is in fact a considerable mass around zero, fat tails and some
right skewness.10 We summarize the main features of these distributions in Table 4. First, there
is investment inaction: firm-year observations with investment rates near zero (less than 2% in
10The skewness and kyrtosis statistics strongly indicate right skewness and a right fat tail in all countries, thus
supporting the non-normality of the investment rate distributions. In all cases, we reject—at the 1% significance
level—the null hypothesis of normality.
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absolute value) range from around 5% in Poland and Romania to 11.4% in Bulgaria in the set
of transition economies, while they are slightly smaller in the set of developed countries, varying
between 6.3% in the U.K. to 2.6% in Germany.11
These periods of inaction are complemented by periods of investment spikes. Since there is not
a unique acceptable criterion, we look at various thresholds in order to define an investment spike.
For an investment episode to be defined as a spike we require it to be occurring rather infrequently,
while at the same time to account for a significant portion of total investment spending. In the
baseline, we define an investment spike when the investment rate exceeds 50%. This threshold
ranges from approximately twice to three times the average investment rate in our sample. In-
vestment rates exceeding 50% account for a considerable fraction of firm-year observations in the
transition economies group, ranging from approximately 14% for the Czech Republic to 23% for
Bulgaria. In the set of developed economies, they account for approximately 17% in the U.K.
to 23.4% in Belgium. Importantly, investment spikes account for a considerable fraction of total
investment spending. As can be seen from Table 4, the average fraction of investment spikes in
total investment (measured by the 50% threshold) ranges from 32% in the Czech Republic to 89%
in Romania, and from 31% in Germany to 61% in the U.K.
We also report an alternative measure of investment lumpiness based on the percentage of
firm-year observations characterized by investment rates at least 2.5 times above the firm-level
median investment rate for each country. Using this criterion, a considerable fraction of firm-
year observations experience an investment spike. The fractions range, for example, from 8.4%
in Poland to 36.6% in Romania in the set of transition economies, and from 12.6% in Belgium to
51.7% in Germany in the developed economies group. Taken together, these observations strongly
suggest investment rates in our dataset are characterized by significant asymmetries and lumpiness
that suggest the presence of fixed capital adjustment costs.12
11We define investment inaction as investment rates less than 2 percent in absolute value. There are few identically
zero investment rates in our sample given that we have firm-level data and aggregation across plants and heterogeneous
capital goods is always likely to generate a small amount of investment, e.g. for maintenance reasons.
12It is important to note that it would be very unlikely to observe so many firm-year observations with investment
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Finally, it is worth noting the very low serial correlations of investment rates in all countries.
Again, these low serial correlations suggest the presence of fixed adjustment costs; if the data were
generated from a model with convex costs only (conditional on the autocorrelation of productivity),
we would expect to observe significantly higher serial correlations in investment rates (see for
example Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006)).13
In summary, the statistics reported in Table 4 strongly suggest the presence of significant fixed
costs of adjustment and investment lumpiness. This is the distinctive feature we exploit in our
sample in order to precisely test the predictions of our model.
5 Baseline specifications and estimation methodology
One of the key predictions of our model is that under costly external finance, firms will accumulate
cash in non-spike periods and use the savings during periods of investment spikes in order to
avoid the cost associated with using external finance. In order to test this prediction we focus on
the estimation of the following empirical model, which relates the firm’s accumulation of cash
(savings) to total assets ratio (Cashit/TotalAssetsit 1) to its cash flow to assets ratio, sales
growth to assets ratio, and size (measured by the logarithm of its total assets). We then interact
our cash flow variable with a dummy variable, which aims to control for the investment regime the
firm is operating in. This leads to the following equation:
rates above the investment spike threshold in the absence of fixed capital adjustment costs. In a world with convex
adjustment costs only, most firm-year observations would in fact be characterized by small and continuous investment
activity. Furthermore, there would be no or very rare evidence of investment inaction. These outcomes can be gener-
ated from a stripped down version of our model with convex capital adjustment costs. We do not present the results
here to save space, but they are available upon request.
13For example with a standard calibration, a model with convex adjustment costs only would produce serial corre-
lation in investment rates that significantly exceeds 0.50.
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Cashit
TotalAssetsit 1
= 0 + 1
sales growthit
TotalAssetsit 1
+ 2
CashF lowit
TotalAssetsit 1
 SPIKEit+
3
CashF lowit
TotalAssetsit 1
 (1  SPIKEit) + 4SIZEit 1 + it (13)
where SPIKEit takes the value of one for firm-year observations with investment rates above
50% and zero otherwise. Note that the regression specification above is identical to the regression
specification used in Section 3, since the (k+ b) in equation (11) corresponds to SIZE in equation
(13). It is a variant of the specification proposed by Almeida et al. (2004), who derive it from a
model of corporate liquidity, and of the one by Khurana et al. (2006), Pal and Ferrando (2010),
and Riddick and Whited (2009), who use it to investigate company financial policies and test for
the presence of capital market imperfections. The crucial difference in our specification compared
to theirs is the fact we control for the (potentially) differential effect of investment regimes on the
savings–cash flow sensitivity.
As most of the firms in our sample are not listed on the stock market, we are unable to assess
their market value. Hence, we control for investment opportunities in two different ways. First,
following La Porta et al. (2000), Konings et al. (2003), Khurana et al. (2006), and Guariglia et al.
(2012), we use the firm’s sales growth, as a proxy for the firm’s future profitability. In addition,
we include time dummies interacted with industry dummies in all specifications. As discussed
in Brown et al. (2009) and Brown and Petersen (2009), since these dummies account for all time-
varying demand shocks at the industry level, their inclusion represents an indirect way to control
for investment opportunities, or more general demand factors.
The error term in equation (13), it, comprises a firm-specific time-invariant component, en-
compassing all time-invariant firm characteristics likely to influence savings, as well as the time-
invariant component of the measurement error affecting any of the regression variables; a time-
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specific component accounting for possible business cycle effects; and an idiosyncratic compo-
nent. We control for the firm-specific time-invariant component of the error term by estimating
the equation using a fixed effects estimator, and for the time-specific component by including time
dummies (in addition to the time dummies interacted with industry dummies) in all our specifica-
tions.14
6 Main results
6.1 Savings specification controlling for investment regimes
The main prediction from the model is that the rate of cash accumulation will differ according to
the investment regime. In particular, the sensitivity of savings to cash flow should be negative for
firms that exhibit investment spikes, and positive otherwise, that is, the savings cash flow sensitivity
should switch sign across investment regimes.15
In order to test this in our sample, we use the definition of investment spikes introduced in
section 4.2, and classify the firms in the sample accordingly. Table 5 presents estimates of equa-
tion (13) for our four transition and four developed countries. In accordance with the prediction
of the model, we observe that the cash flow sensitivity of savings varies significantly with the in-
vestment regime. In particular, the coefficients on ( CashF low
TotalAssets
 (1   SPIKE)), which capture
the savings-cash flow sensitivities during periods of inactivity (or low activity), are always posi-
tive and statistically significant. They range from values of approximately 0.033 for Romania to
0.079 for Bulgaria in the transition group; and from 0.057 for Germany to 0.132 for Belgium in the
14We have confirmed the robustness of our findings to using an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimator (with-
out controlling for fixed effects) as well as two Instrumental Variables (IV) estimators, namely, OLS-IV and system
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) (Blundell and Bond (1998)). However, given concerns with the appro-
priate selection of instruments and specification tests that accompany them (see Erickson and Whited (2012); and
Roberts and Whited (2013) for a discussion) we chose to report only the fixed effects results. The OLS-IV and system
GMM results are available upon request. The OLS results are reported in Appendix A, Table A.1.
15In Appendix A we report results from the standard specification that does not control for investment regimes
(as in Almeida et al. (2004)). The findings from these specifications (see Table A.2) are in line with the findings in
Almeida et al. (2004) and Khurana et al. (2006) who find positive and significant savings to cash flow sensitivities.
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developed group. By contrast, the interaction terms between cash flow and the investment spike
( CashF low
TotalAssets
 (SPIKE)) have negative and statistically significant coefficients in all cases. They
range from -0.039 for Bulgaria to -0.058 for Czech Republic in the transition group, and from -
0.047 for France to -0.083 for Belgium in the developed group. In addition, as indicated by the test
of equality at the foot of Table 5 (p-values), the interactions between cash flow and the SPIKE
dummy are significantly different from the interactions between cash flow and the (1  SPIKE)
dummy, at the 5% level, in all countries considered.16 Overall, the results from this regression
specification provide strong support to the predictions of our model.
As already discussed, the distinctive feature of our proposed specification, is that it controls
for investment regimes. By contrast, the standard specification used in Almeida et al. (2004) or
Riddick and Whited (2009), that does not account for investment regimes, cannot test the pre-
diction that the cash flow sensitivity of cash accumulation should switch sign across different
investment regimes. The fact that we have a sample that includes information from different in-
vestment regimes makes our proposed specification able to sharpen the test based on the standard
savings specification. Because they work with much larger firms,17 Riddick and Whited (2009)
do not have this rich sample information and thus can only test a conditional model prediction.
Finally, it is interesting to note that when Riddick and Whited (2009), (page 1763), examine a very
small cross section of firms exhibiting lumpy investment, they report positive sensitivities of cash
accumulation to cash flow, in line with our findings in Table 5.18
16We have also experimented with alternative cut-offs to define the spikes (investment rates exceeding 60% and
70%) and found qualitatively similar results. The results are not reported for brevity, but available upon request.
17The average firm size in Riddick and Whited (2009)’s dataset is approximately 10 times larger than the average
firm size in our sample.
18A noteworthy point made by Riddick and Whited (2009) on the use of savings–cash flow sensitivities as predictors
of financing constraints is the potential confounding role of uncertainty on the size of the cash flow coefficient. In their
model, more constrained firms are predicted to have larger negative coefficients compared to unconstrained firms. At
the same time, they show that in the presence of a volatile productivity process, the size of the cash flow coefficient de-
creases in absolute value. Because in their sample, small (constrained) firms have more volatile productivity (income)
processes compared to large (unconstrained) firms, it is found (in some sub-samples) that the cash flow coefficient is
smaller (in absolute value) for smaller firms, thus going against the prediction of a larger (absolute) coefficient. Thus,
uncertainty can confound the interpretation of the savings–cash flow sensitivity as a summary measure of financial
constraints.
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While a secondary issue for our purpose, it is worth noting that Riddick and Whited (2009)
obtain a negative sensitivity even once they correct for measurement error in Tobin’s Q using
the procedure explained in Erickson and Whited (2002). We note our approach side-steps the
measurement error problem present in Tobin’s Q since our firms are unlisted and we use firm-
specific and industry information to capture time varying demand factors and hence investment
opportunities.19 We thus believe, the differential sensitivities we obtain are unlikely to be due to
measurement error.
6.2 Testing additional model predictions
Our main focus has been to examine the sensitivity of savings to cash flow controlling for invest-
ment lumpiness. However, our model makes additional predictions and we test them in this section.
First, the model predicts that cash should be going down during periods of investment spikes, and
gradually increase after those periods when investment activity is low. Second, it predicts that the
cash flow sensitivity of savings should switch from positive to zero at some point after the firm has
undergone an investment spike.
First additional prediction. Table 6 reports results from a specification that tests for the first
additional prediction of our model. The equation we estimate is as follows:
Cashit
TotalAssetsit 1
= 0 + 1
sales growthit
TotalAssetsit 1
+ 2SPIKEit+
3SPIKEit;14 + 4SIZEit 1 + it (14)
The SPIKE dummy is identical as in the baseline specification, whereas the new dummy,
19D’Espallier and Guariglia (2015) shows that the investment opportunity bias is not a serious problem for unlisted
firms.
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SPIKE14, records four subsequent periods after investment spike periods, requiring that they
refer to low investment activity periods. We define low investment activity as those periods where
investment rates do not exceed 15% (matching the average depreciation rate in our sample). That
is, if an investment spike occurs in period t, SPIKE14 will be equal to one in period t + 1; t +
2; t + 3; t + 4 if the average investment rate in those four periods does not exceed 15%, and zero
otherwise. We observe that the coefficients on the SPIKE dummy are significantly negative in all
eight countries, while the coefficients on the SPIKE14 dummy are in general significantly positive
(with the exception of Romania and Germany). In line with the model’s predictions, these results
indicate that cash falls during spike periods and gradually builds up in the subsequent periods of
low activity (or inactivity), suggesting firms are accumulating cash anticipating a future spike.
Second additional prediction. Table 7 reports results from a specification that tests for the
second additional prediction of our model. The equation we estimate is as follows:
Cashit
TotalAssetsit 1
= 0 + 1
sales growthit
TotalAssetsit 1
+ 2
CashF lowit
TotalAssetsit 1
 SPIKEit+
3
CashF lowit
TotalAssetsit 1
 SPIKEit;14 + 4 CashF lowit
TotalAssetsit 1
OTHERit + 5SIZEit 1 + it (15)
The SPIKE and SPIKE14 dummies are identical as above and the new dummy OTHER
records periods that are neither spikes nor any of the four low investment activity periods after the
spike. The OTHER dummy seeks to capture those periods after cash buildup has run its course
following a spike. We therefore test whether firms are accumulating cash during the periods after
the spike, use this cash to finance the spike and revert to no cash accumulation in all other periods
following the cash accumulation. We find (with the exception of Bulgaria and German that the
cash flow sensitivity of cash accumulation switches from positive during SPIKE14, to negative
when the SPIKE occurs (with the exception of Bulgaria). We also find support, in four out of
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eight cases, that the cash flow sensitivity switches to zero during OTHER, broadly supporting the
second additional prediction of the model.
6.3 Robustness to an alternative investment spike definition
In the main specification we use in equation (13), the results of which are reported in Table 5, we
define investment spikes as investment rates exceeding 50% for both groups of countries. In this
section we examine the robustness of our results to an alternative measure of investment spikes.
Specifically, we use one of the alternative measures of investment lumpiness reported in Table 4,
based on the investment rates being at least 2.5 times above the firm-level median investment rate
for each country and industry. This alternative measure, has the advantage of taking into account
the norm of investment rates across countries and industries, which could be different due to tech-
nological factors (which could vary by industry) and other macroeconomic factors (which could
vary by country). In this sense, it can be thought of as normalizing investment spikes across coun-
tries and industries. We report the estimation results in Table 8. To distinguish the new SPIKE
dummy from our baseline definition, we call it SPIKEROBUST . The results from this alternative
measure are in line with our baseline results reported in Table 5. That is, the savings–cash flow
sensitivity reverses sign according to the investment regime in all eight cases. Importantly, as in-
dicated by the tests of equality at the foot of Table 8 (p-values), the coefficients on the interactions
between cash flow and the SPIKEROBUST dummy are always significantly different from the
interactions between cash flow and the (1  SPIKEROBUST ) dummy, at the 5% level.
6.4 How might credit lines affect our results?
Recent literature on liquidity management suggests that bank credit lines can work as substitutes
for cash. How might credit lines affect our empirical results? Credit lines allow firms to access
pre-committed financing up to a certain quantity in exchange for the payment of a commitment
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fee (Almeida et al. (2013)). More specifically, credit lines can be seen as an insurance contract:
The bank provides the firm with funds when the firm faces a liquidity shortfall and, in exchange,
the bank collects payment from the firm when the firm does not need the funds under the line
(Archaya et al. (2013)). Credit lines are widely used around the world: For instance, Lins et al.
(2010) argue that “lines of credit are the dominant source of liquidity for most companies around
the world, amounting to about 15% of assets”. Along similar lines, Campello et al. (2011) show
that access to credit lines was crucial in allowing firms to invest and survive during the recent
financial crisis. Yet, Almeida et al. (2013) argue that whilst credit lines can be seen as an alternative
to cash holdings, cash remains “king”, in that it is “still the predominant way in which firms
ensure future liquidity for future investments.” One reason why this may be the case is that credit
line contracts typically contain covenants that allow banks to restrict credit lines drawdowns if
the covenants are violated (Sufi (2009)). Ippolito and Perez (2012) conclude that only firms in
healthy conditions can meet the requirements imposed by the covenants attached to the credit
lines. Another reason could be that bank lines of credit to firms with greater aggregate risk are
costlier (Archaya et al. (2013)). A third reason may be that credit lines are issued with a precise
stated purpose, which restricts their possible uses. Credit lines are therefore less flexible than
cash (Ippolito and Perez (2012)). Finally, credit lines have a predetermined maturity, which limits
their use for long-term investment (Ippolito and Perez (2012)). Lins et al. (2010) argue that non-
operational cash guards against future cash flow shocks in bad times, while credit lines give firms
the option to exploit future business opportunities available in good times. This suggests that the
two types of liquidity are not perfect substitutes. Within our setting, if firms relied on credit lines
instead of drawing down their cash reserves in order to finance investment spikes, we would not
observe such large cash decumulation during spikes and cash accumulation thereafter. The fact
that we do find these large effects indicates that lines of credit do not play such an important role in
relation to investment spikes. Unfortunately, however, data on credit lines are not available within
our dataset, so we are unable to test for these effects directly.
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7 Conclusions
We propose a simple investment model with lumpy investment and cash accumulation and test a
key prediction, namely, that under costly external finance, savings–cash flow sensitivities will vary
significantly by investment regime. In line with the model, our empirical approach builds on a
savings regression as in Almeida et al. (2004) and introduces an important modification—while
nesting the latter—to control for investment regimes. This allows for a sharper empirical test of
our model’s key prediction, that focuses not on the sign of the sensitivity per se but on whether
the sensitivity switches sign across investment regimes. We test this prediction using a panel of
firms from transition and developed economies and find positive and significant savings-cash flow
sensitivities for firms that operate in the investment inactivity (or low activity) regime, and negative
and significant sensitivities for firms that operate in the investment spike regime.
We believe that the advantage of the modified specification we propose is its simplicity: it is
easily applicable to a wide range of data sets, since it only requires one to find some occurrences of
investment inactivity and investment bursts in order to define the SPIKE dummy. In principle, as
long as the sample contains small firms that tend to invest infrequently and more heavily compared
to large firms, this should be possible. Alternatively, one could look at various types of investment
spending and find those that typically involve large projects (such as investment in plant). This
type of spending typically occurs in bursts (see for example Sakellaris (2004) for evidence), thus
one could utilize such information in order to define spikes.
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A Appendix A
A.1 Numerical solution and calibration
We apply value function iteration to solve the model. We discretize the state variables over a
certain interval. The size of the interval is chosen in such a way that the variables remain in the
state space during the simulations. The number of grid points per interval guarantees that the
results are insensitive to using a finer grid. We discretize the state space of kt into 150 grid points,
that of bt into 20 points, and that of st into 10 points. The process for the productivity shock is
approximated as a first order Markov process, using the method by Tauchen (1986). We form
a guess for the value function, and based on this guess, we find policy functions that maximize
the value function. We use the maximized value function obtained and repeat the procedure until
convergence is achieved. We do not use a specific country as the basis for the calibration. Rather,
we select parameter values that can be thought of as targeting the average of all countries. The
results are robust to reasonable perturbations of the parameters. We set the risk-free rate equal to
2.65%. This value corresponds to the average (across countries) real yield for a 10 year government
bond over the sample period. We set the discount factor, , to 0.97, which implies (1 + r) < 1,
a necessary assumption in order for cash to be dominated in the case without costly finance. This
can be thought of as a higher discount rate of firm owners relative to the market’s discount rate.
We set the capital share in production, , at 0.7. Since we did not have any information from the
sample, in order to be able to estimate or calibrate this parameter, we chose a value that implies
decreasing returns to capital in production. We have experimented with varying this between 0.4
and 0.6, with no noticeable change in the results. Our chosen value is close to the one used by
Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006). The depreciation rate is set at 0.15, in line with the ratio of total
depreciation to capital in our sample. The capital adjustment cost parameters are set to the values
reported in Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006), i.e we set the variable cost parameter, , at 0.049 and
the fixed cost parameter, F , at 0.039. The parameter that determines the external finance cost, ,
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is set equal to 0.07. This value implies a premium for using external funds equal to 7%. This
choice is guided (though it is only an imprecise mapping) by the interest burden (i.e. the ratio
of total interest expense to total debt) observed in our sample, which varies between 6% for the
U.K. to 33% for Romania. Finally, the persistence and standard deviation of the idiosyncratic
productivity shock are chosen in order to come as close as possible to the persistence and volatility
of investment rates in our sample as reported in Table 4 and Table 3 (last row, standard deviation
reported in parenthesis). Specifically, we set  = 0:75 and  = 0:2. This gives a persistence in
investment rates in our simulated sample (in the industry with costly external finance with 25,000
firm–year observations) equal to 0.14 and a standard deviation equal to 0.44, which are within the
range of values observed in our sample (see Tables 3 and 4).20
To help the reader visualize how cash policy is affected by lumpy investment, the Figure below
plots investment, cash and savings policies derived from a simple version of the model, whereby
we have only allowed the choice of cash to be within a two point grid and the productivity shock to
be within a three point grid (low, medium high). The black line denotes investment and associated
cash policies when productivity is low. The green line denotes the corresponding policies when
productivity is high. Thus, the shift from the black to the green line is caused by a positive cash flow
shock. Notice that both investment and cash policies are non-linear (conditional on productivity).
Firm investment oscillates between an activity regime, where the optimal investment spending
depends on existing capital stock, and an inaction regime. Inaction occurs for all capital stocks
to the right of the threshold level of capital. This threshold level is the one for which the value
function generated from inaction is identical to the value function generated from activity. The
associated cash policy follows a low-high pattern: to the left of the threshold level of capital the
firm invests and cash balances are equal to zero, whereas to the right of this threshold, the firm
does not invest and quickly accumulates positive cash balances to prepare for the next investment
20Since we are only interested in simulating panels of firms, and not in matching, for example, industry dynamics,
for simplicity, we ignore any common component in the productivity process across firms.
29
Figure A1: Policy functions
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Notes: The Figure plots investment policy, cash policy and savings policy generated by the model as functions of the capital stock. The policy
functions are generated using the baseline calibration of the model. For ease of exposition and interpretation we have only allowed the choice of
cash to be within a two point grid and the productivity shock to be within a three point grid (low, medium high).
30
episode. We can better understand the savings policy by analyzing two cases. In the first case, we
assume the firm has capital between threshold level 1 and threshold level 2 and the productivity
level is low. The firm is in an inactivity regime for this level of productivity (black line). Cash
balances are positive (shown by the black line). Let a positive cash flow shock distort this situation
as the firm experiences a high productivity shock. The optimal response is a burst of investment.
This takes the firm somewhere on the green investment line. The optimal cash policy is given by
the green line. Because cash flow is not sufficient, the firm quickly uses all of its cash to finance
this investment spike and cash balances fall to zero. This investment spike will take the firm to the
inaction regime (where the green investment line is zero) and associated cash balances will rise
quickly (green positive line). In the second case, the firm begins with a capital stock strictly below
the threshold level 1. In this case the high productivity shock generates low investment activity (in
the simulation exercises of Section 3, this is normally associated with investment that replaces the
depreciated capital stock). In this case however, cash balances do not change as a result of higher
productivity, that is, cash flow suffices to finance this low investment activity and the firm hoards
the cash in anticipation of a future investment spike. The left panel in the Figure plots the savings
behavior. Savings is equal to zero, becomes negative during the spike and then positive after the
spike. Once cash is built up to the optimal level, savings switches again to zero. Thus the savings–
cash flow sensitivity switches sign from negative to positive around the episode of an investment
spike, while it is zero during inaction or low activity spells. In the full model where the choice
of cash is not only low or high but allows for more intermediate values, the savings–cash flow
sensitivity is also positive for very low investment activity, that is cash balances may increase. To
facilitate the illustration with the special case of the model, this feature is, however, not captured
in this Figure.
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A.2 OLS estimator
We report results from estimating the main specification, equation (13), using an Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) estimator (without controlling for fixed effects) with White-corrected standard er-
rors, adjusted to account for within cluster correlation. The results from this estimation method are
reported in Table A.1 and are remarkably similar to those reported in Table 5 using the fixed effects
estimator, confirming the key prediction of our model regarding the sign switch in the savings-cash
flow sensitivity.
A.3 Standard savings specifications
For comparison purposes with the earlier studies noted in the main body we also estimate the
savings specification without the dummy SPIKEit, i.e,
Cashit
TotalAssetsit 1
= 0 + 1
Salesgrowthit
TotalAssetsit 1
+ 2
CashF lowit
TotalAssetsit 1
+ 3SIZEit 1 + it (16)
The results from this specification are reported in Table A.2 and are in line with findings re-
ported in Almeida et al. (2004) and Khurana et al. (2006).
A.4 Sensitivity of the model’s main prediction to model parameters
We examine the robustness of the model’s main prediction, namely the sign switch of the savings–
cash flow sensitivity to variation in model parameters. Similar to the exercise performed in Riddick and Whited
(2009), we consider variation in the shock serial correlation, shock volatility, linear equity cost, re-
turns to scale, fixed adjustment cost, and quadratic adjustment cost. Thus, we vary parameters one
at a time while keeping all the other parameters at their baseline values. Tables A.3 to A.8 report
these results. The sign switch in the savings cash flow sensitivity obtains for all parameter sets
considered.
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A.5 Variable construction
This section provides the definition of variables used in the empirical section of the paper.
 Total assets: sum of the firm’s fixed and current assets, where fixed assets include tangible fixed assets,
intangible fixed assets, and other fixed assets; and current assets include inventories, accounts receivable, and
other current assets.
 Cash flow: net income plus depreciation.
 Cash: cash and equivalents.
 Fixed investment: difference between the book value of tangible fixed assets (which include land and build-
ings; fixtures and fittings; and plant and vehicles) of end of year t and end of year t-1, plus depreciation of year
t.
 Capital stock: tangible fixed assets.
 Sales growth: sales growth.
 Sales: firm’s total sales (including domestic and overseas sales).
 Deflators: all variables are deflated using the GDP deflator for the relevant country.
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Figure 1: Investment rates by country
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Table 1: Simulated savings regressions
Controlling for investment regime with SPIKE dummy
Panel with costly external finance Panel with costless external finance
(1) (2)
CashFlow
b+k *(1  SPIKE) 0.085*** 0
(0.011)
CashFlow
b+k *(SPIKE) -0.985*** 0
(0.016)
k + b -0.014*** 0
(0.0003)
salesgrowth
b+k 0.129*** 0
(0.008)
Observations 25,000 25,000
R
2
0.43
Test of equality (p-value): Cash Flow 0.00
Conventional savings specification
Panel with costly external finance Panel with costless external finance
CashFlow
b+k 0.106*** 0
(0.010)
k + b -0.005*** 0
(0.0002)
salesgrowth
b+k -0.278*** 0
(0.009)
Observations 25,000 25,000
R
2
0.06
Notes: The dependent variable is bit+1
bit+kit
. All specifications were estimated using OLS. SPIKE is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 for
firm i if firm i’s investment rate greater than 50%, and zero otherwise. The figures in parentheses are White-corrected standard errors, adjusted to
account for within cluster correlation. * indicates significance at the 10% level. ** indicates significance at the 5% level. *** indicates significance
at the 1% level.
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Table 3: Summary statistics
Bulgaria Czech Republic Poland Romania Belgium France Germany UK
Cash=A 0.063 0.070 0.062 0.058 0.091 0.076 0.059 0.088
(0.094) (0.083) (0.083) (0.085) (0.124) (0.106) (0.096) (0.121)
Cash=A 0.009 0.006 0.008 0.0008 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.006
(0.065) (0.052) (0.051) (0.061) (0.062) (0.056) (0.054) (0.075)
Sales growth=A 0.178 0.130 0.165 0.016 0.042 0.072 0.065 0.007
(0.520) (0.329) (0.416) (0.489) (0.253) (0.255) (0.288) (0.394)
CashF low=A 0.107 0.104 0.129 0.132 0.107 0.088 0.099 0.101
(0.107) (0.090) (0.122) (0.173) (0.084) (0.076) (0.082) (0.100)
Cash 2.179 6.086 5.422 1.547 17.415 18.823 26.452 39.472
(4.339) (10.732) (9.871) (3.219) (33.297) (37.446) (51.782) (78.950)
A 63.008 128.806 115.832 38.526 314.768 404.065 795.584 704.554
(97.823) (177.190) (150.372) (67.001) (598.945) (696.844) (1342.83) (1397.37)
I=K 0.319 0.221 0.263 0.169 0.350 0.344 0.304 0.261
(0.540) (0.276) (0.345) (0.642) (0.404) (0.365) (0.320) (0.353)
Observations 2,250 7,479 5,428 4,513 8,475 21,574 3,204 10,214
Notes: A represents the firm’s total real assets (expressed in thousands of euros); Cash represents real cash holdings, expressed in thousands of
euros. I represents investment; and K the capital stock. The numbers in this Table are means, with standard deviations in parentheses. Also see
Appendix A for precise definitions of all variables.
Table 4: Investment lumpiness
Bulgaria Czech Republic Poland Romania Belgium France Germany UK
Investment rates within 2% 11.4% 6.8% 4.7% 5.5% 5.6% 3.7% 2.6% 6.3%
Investment rates > 70% 17.1% 8.1% 12.0% 16.5% 14.9% 13.4% 11.2% 10.8%
Investment rates > 50% 23.0% 13.8% 19.2% 21.4% 23.4% 22.2% 19.2% 17.2%
Investment rates: 2.5 times
above firm median 18.2% 11.5% 8.4% 36.6% 12.6% 31.5% 51.7% 47.5%
I50
K
I
K
0.81 0.32 0.68 0.89 0.59 0.40 0.31 0.61
Correlation ( IK ; (
I
K ) 1) 0.13 0.09 0.14 0.01 0.25 0.26 0.36 0.25
Notes: Investment rates are defined as investment over capital ( I
K
). Firm level medians are computed separately for each country and industry. I50
K
is the total investment undertaken by those firms when there is a spike (defined as investment rates > 50%) divided by the capital stock of all firms
in the sample.
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